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Abstract 
The idea that environmental trade policy can be used to achieve competitive advantage in international 
markets has important implications for the way we conceive free trade. This paper considers strategic 
environmental policy in a model that makes explicit the vertical structure that supports production of the 
traded good. Including intranational vertical relationships in the analysis of strategic environmental trade 
policy has substantial qualitative effects. When vertical contracts are allowed, the optimal policy to levy on 
a polluting input under both quantity and price competition in the international market is the Pigouvian 
tax. 
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1. Introduction 
The potential use of environmental regulations to achieve competitive advantage in 
international markets is a topic of growing policy concern. As the WTO continues to tighten 
restrictions on traditional government export programs, environmental regulations and other 
input market controls are being increasingly scrutinized as potential instruments for strategic 
trade. The OECD, the WTO, the European Commission, and other international organizations 
have recently evaluated possible environmental tax reforms and their effect on national and 
regional welfare and competitiveness (see [12,14]). The possibility that governments may 
compromise environmental regulations to gain competitive advantage is an issue of considerable 
policy importance for the way we conceive free trade. 
Since Markusen [11], the potential role of environmental policy as an indirect instrument of 
trade policy is a subject that has received a great deal of attention. Recent research along these 
lines has developed international oligopoly models that combine incentives for pollution control 
with the rent-shifting motivations for trade policy ﬁrst noted by Brander and Spencer [3]. The 
balance struck between these opposing incentives has led the strategic environmental trade policy 
literature to a series of negative results. Under quantity competition in the international oligopoly 
market, Conrad [5] and Barrett [1] demonstrate that the optimal non-cooperative environmental 
tax under-internalizes the domestic externality. Under price competition, Barrett [1] derives the 
opposite result that the optimal non-cooperative environmental policy over-internalizes the 
domestic externality.1 In each case, the incentive of the government regulator to fully internalize 
domestic environmental damages is tempered, on the margin, by her desire to achieve competitive 
advantage. This outcome, which has been coined the ‘‘environment-for-trade’’ policy result, has 
been subsequently extended by Kennedy [10] to examine transboundary pollution, by Nannerup 
[13] to consider incomplete information, and by Ulph [18], Ulph [17], and Simpson and Bradford 
[16] to analyze the effect of additional stages of investment and R&D. These extensions modify, 
but do not remove, the incentive of the domestic regulator to compromise environmental policy 
for the interest of trade. 
This paper challenges the environment-for-trade policy result by taking a broader view of the 
vertical industry structure that encompasses the input market. We consider an international 
environmental policy game that is essentially identical to that in [1,5]; however, we introduce 
within this game an intranational subgame in which downstream and upstream ﬁrm(s) engage in 
vertical contracts of the form considered by Vickers [19] and Bonanno and Vickers [2]. Our 
analysis thus bridges some major themes in the strategic environmental trade policy and vertical 
separation literatures: Regulators design environmental policy to balance incentives for pollution 
control and competitive advantage, while ﬁrms employ vertical contracts that respond to this 
policy design. 
We model the case in which environmental regulation is levied on a polluting input while trade 
occurs in an intermediate or ﬁnal downstream good. This context, which encompasses many 
important circumstances of international environmental regulations, allows the potential for 
decentralized contracts to emerge as a commitment device between vertically separated ﬁrms. 
Bonanno and Vickers [2] consider two-part tariff contracts in vertically separated industries and 
show that the optimal contract speciﬁes an upstream price below (above) marginal cost when 
downstream competition involves strategic substitutes (complements). To the extent that this 
contracted upstream price deviates from the Walrasian price, the vertical contract is a 
commitment mechanism that plays a similar role as an input subsidy (tax) under strategic trade 
policy. The essential difference is that participation by the (polluting) upstream ﬁrm is voluntary; 
indeed it must be induced by the payment of a lump-sum tariff in the case of the vertical contract. 
The relationship we consider between vertical market structure and international environmental 
policy is important for several reasons. First, from a trade policy perspective, internationally 
exchanged goods are often produced in vertically structured sectors that admit the potential for 
1 These ﬁndings parallel the strategic trade results of Eaton and Grossman [6], who show, in a model without 
pollution, that the trade policy which maximizes competitive advantage is a subsidy when ﬁrms choose strategic 
substitutes, but a tax when ﬁrms choose strategic complements. 
contractual linkages to arise between ﬁrms. Coordinated vertical relationships are known to exist, 
moreover, for many important traded goods. Japanese keiretsu and Korean chaebols 
organizations involve linked equity interests between vertically aligned ﬁrms, and in US 
agricultural markets, ‘‘backwards’’ vertical contracts between food manufacturers and farm 
product producers are widely recognized as a common practice.2 Governments also coordinate 
vertical markets through the use of state trading enterprises, which create separation between 
domestic and international markets through payment arrangements that combine an initial 
transfer price with a share of the subsequent international proceeds.3 Second, from an 
environmental policy perspective, a multi-market framework adds an important dimension to 
the regulatory context. The primary interface between the economy and the environment is in 
upstream raw product industries, whereas the balance of international trade is in intermediate and 
ﬁnal goods. Finally, from purely a modeling standpoint, suppressing the vertical sequence of 
production that supports a traded good creates a policy context in which rent-shifting strategies 
are external to market participants. By construction, this can signiﬁcantly alter the qualitative 
implications of the model. In light of these observations, it is surprising to note that there has been 
virtually no discussion to date on the effect of vertical market structure on the design of 
international environmental policy. 
Under circumstances in which ﬁrms engage in vertical contracts, we ﬁnd the unilateral optimal 
emission policy to be a Pigouvian tax. This result, which holds under both price and quantity 
competition in the international market, obtains because a vertical contract provides the 
exporting ﬁrm with an input pricing mechanism that substitutes perfectly for a government 
subsidy (tax) as a commitment device. Strategic distortion in environmental policy, as a 
consequence, becomes unnecessary. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate a model 
consisting of an international environmental policy game between governments and an 
intranational contract subgame between upstream and downstream ﬁrms. In Section 3, we 
examine the implication of vertical contracts for the non-cooperative policy equilibrium under 
quantity competition, and in Section 4, we extend the analysis to the case of price competition. 
2. Model structure 
We frame our model around a decentralized vertical market structure that supports a traded 
good. Productive activities in the sector are organized between an upstream ﬁrm and a 
downstream ﬁrm in each country. Upstream ﬁrms are competitive and produce a polluting input 
ðxÞ: The polluting input is used by a downstream ﬁrm to produce a ﬁnished good ðyÞ; which is 
subsequently sold in an international export market. Downstream ﬁrms compete, either in 
quantities or in prices, in a differentiated product market comprised of a domestic ﬁrm and a 
foreign ﬁrm, which we denote hereafter with the superscripts d and f ; respectively. 
2 Vertical contracts are also common in the production and distribution of coal and natural gas, in automobile and 
aerospace industries, and in bulk shipping markets. 
3 Hamilton and Stiegert [9] ﬁnd that the initial procurement price set by the Canadian Wheat Board generally falls 
within a range consistent with the optimal contract price to achieve vertical separation in the international durum 
market. 
The timing of the environmental policy game is as follows. In the ﬁrst stage, the regulator in 
county i chooses an emission tax rate ðtiÞ on the polluting input, and in the second stage, the 
downstream ﬁrms compete in an international oligopoly market. The second stage encompasses 
an intranational contract subgame in which downstream ﬁrms can enter into contractual 
arrangements with upstream suppliers that stipulate rules for exchange of the polluting input. 
We consider a two-part tariff, or ﬁxed price, contract form. Fixed price contracts, which are a 
commonly observed form of contractual arrangement in industrial nations, have been studied 
extensively in the vertical separation literature (see, e.g., [4,19] under circumstances of quantity 
competition; [2,15] under price competition).4 The terms of the contract written by the 
downstream ﬁrm in country i specify a wholesale price for the polluting input, $ i; and a ﬁxed 
transfer payment, Fi; to be exchanged between the downstream and upstream ﬁrms.5 
Throughout, we place no restrictions on the sign of this ﬁxed transfer. 
In the event that the contract is rejected, the downstream ﬁrm in country i is assumed to 
purchase the input on country i’s spot market at a price of wi ¼ wiðtiÞ: The market price for the 
polluting input in country i; in turn, is governed by the level of the environmental tax in country i; 
ti; according to 
i i iwiðtiÞ ¼ w þ t e ; ð1Þ0 
iwhere w is the base price of the polluting input and ei is the emissions coefﬁcient in country i (i.e.,0 
the quantity of emissions per unit of input). Throughout, we assume that environmental damage 
is local, and that governments of consuming countries have no means to inﬂuence the policy of 
producing countries. 
3. Quantity competition 
Let PdðY Þ denote the inverse demand function of the domestic ﬁrm and Pf ðYÞ denote the 
inverse demand function of the foreign ﬁrm in the downstream international market, where 
Y ¼ ðyd; yf Þ is the vector of export quantities, and let Ciðyi; wiðtiÞÞ denote the variable cost 
function of downstream ﬁrm i; where wiðtiÞ is the market price of the polluting input given by (1).6 
Denoting derivatives by subscripts, we assume Ci 40; Ci X0; Ci 40; and Ci 40; and limit our y yy w yw 
attention to circumstances in which the two outputs are substitutes, Pijo0: 
In the output stage, given that the upstream ﬁrm accepts the contract proposed by the domestic 
ddownstream ﬁrm, the downstream ﬁrm maximizes proﬁt, pdðy ; Y ; $d; FdÞ ¼ PdðY Þyd � 
Cdðyd; $dÞ � Fd; where $d and Fd are the terms speciﬁed previously in the contract.7 The 
4 The qualitative predictions of the model would be unchanged if the contractual arrangement provided for equity-
sharing between upstream and downstream ﬁrms (see, e.g. [8]). 
5 Depending on the nature of competition, the contract may contain additional clauses such as capacity constraints 
and exclusive dealing arrangements. See footnotes 8 and 11. 
6 For notational simplicity, all other input prices in the cost function are suppressed. 
7 Sunk costs, which play no role in the analysis, are consequently omitted. 
ﬁrst-order necessary condition is 
d ddPdp ¼ PdðYÞ þ y ðYÞ � Cdðy ; $dÞ ¼ 0: ð2Þd d y 
Proceeding similarly, the ﬁrst-order condition for the downstream foreign ﬁrm is 
f ff Pfp ¼ Pf ðY Þ þ y ðY Þ � Cf ðy ; $ f Þ ¼ 0: ð3Þf f y
In the event that the downstream ﬁrm in country i does not contract with the upstream ﬁrm(s), 
which may occur, for instance, through compliance with antitrust laws in country i; then $ i ¼ 
wiðtiÞ and Fi ¼ 0 in either (2) or (3). 
d f d fLetting D ¼ p � p fd; we assume the following conditions hold: ddpff df p
i ipiio0; pijo0; D40: ð4Þ 
The ﬁrst condition is necessary for proﬁt maximization. The second condition states that a ﬁrm’s 
marginal proﬁt decreases with its rival’s quantity, which ensures that reaction functions slope 
downward. The last condition is necessary for stability of the Nash equilibrium. These 
assumptions imply the existence of a unique equilibrium in quantities deﬁned by the solution to 
(2) and (3). Denote these equilibrium quantities 
d;cð$d f ;cð$dY c ¼ ðy ; $ f Þ; y ; $ f ÞÞ: 
Now consider the contract stage of the subgame. To obtain the polluting input, the downstream 
ﬁrm must offer the upstream producer a contract that is (at least weakly) proﬁt increasing. At the 
same time, the downstream ﬁrm will not offer a contract that earns negative proﬁt. It follows that 
the supplier chosen by the downstream ﬁrm in the equilibrium contractual relation agrees to the 
terms ð$d; FdÞ that maximize the downstream ﬁrm’s proﬁt subject to a constraint of nonnegative 
proﬁt in the upstream market, 
d;cmax PdðY cÞy d;c � Cdðy ; $dÞ � Fd ð5Þ 
$d;Fd 
such that 
ð$d � w dðtdÞÞx d þ FdX0; ð6Þ 
dwhere xd ¼ xdðyd;cÞ denotes the quantity of the polluting input, with x 40:8 Recognizing that the y 
optimal contract terms for the domestic downstream ﬁrm leave the upstream supplier at the 
reservation proﬁt level, it follows that (6) always binds. Substituting this expression into (5) yields 
max PdðY cÞy d;c � Cdðy d;c; $dÞ þ ð$d � w dðtdÞÞx d: ð7Þ 
$d 
8 To ensure non-negative proﬁts for the upstream ﬁrm, a contract that speciﬁes $dowdðtdÞ may also involve a 
capacity constraint that slightly exceeds the equilibrium demand of the downstream ﬁrm. In this case, the downstream 
ﬁrm’s cost function would exhibit a discontinuity which, although not relevant on the equilibrium path, serves to 
safeguard the upstream ﬁrm off the equilibrium path. 
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Differentiating (7) with respect to $d and making use of Shephard’s lemma (i.e., 
Cd $ ðyd; $dÞ ¼  xd) gives 
½Pd þ y d;cPd d � Cd y þ ð$d � w dðtdÞÞx d y �
@yd;c 
@$d 
þ y d;cPd f 
@yf ;c 
@$d 
¼ 0: ð8Þ 
Next, substitute (2) into (8) to get 
ð$d � w dðtdÞÞx d y 
@yd;c 
@$d 
þ y d;cPd f 
@yf ;c 
@$d 
¼ 0: ð9Þ 
If the foreign downstream ﬁrm also adopts a contract, the terms of the proﬁt-maximizing contract 
for the foreign ﬁrm would be symmetric to those implied by (9). 
Totally differentiating the ﬁrst-order conditions from the output stage gives 
d;c Cd f f ;c �Cd f@y y$ pff @y y$ pfd¼ o0; ¼ 40: ð10Þ 
@$d D @$d D 
Notice that the implicit structure of (9) and (10) ensures that the qualitative nature of the contract 
by the domestic downstream ﬁrm is independent of the foreign ﬁrm’s choice of contract terms. 
The rival wholesale price, $ f ; is an argument that affects only the magnitude, and not the sign, of 
the comparative statics effects in (10). 
Proposition 1. The equilibrium vertical contract for the downstream ﬁrm in country i involves an 
upstream price below the regulated price of the polluting input ð$ iowiðtiÞÞ and a positive lump sum 
payment to the upstream ﬁrm ðFi40Þ: 
Proof. Suppose not. Then there are two cases to consider for the domestic country. If $d ¼ 
wdðtdÞ; then the ﬁrst term in (9) is zero, while the second term is negative. Therefore $dawdðtdÞ: If 
$d4wdðtdÞ; then both terms are negative. Therefore, $dowdðtdÞ; from which Fd40 follows 
immediately from (6). The same holds for the foreign ﬁrm. & 
By committing to pay a lower input price, the domestic downstream ﬁrm is able to increase his 
oligopoly rent in the international market. In total, of course, the direct contribution of the lower 
input price to the domestic ﬁrm’s proﬁt is exactly offset by the payment of a lump-sum transfer to 
the upstream producer. Nonetheless, a lower input price alters the set of credible actions for the 
domestic ﬁrm in his rivalry with the foreign ﬁrm for the international oligopoly rent. By 
contracting with the upstream producer for a lower input price in exchange for a compensatory 
ﬁxed payment, the reaction function of the domestic ﬁrm shifts to the right, which permits a 
credible output expansion to take place in the international market. 
In stage one of the environmental policy game, the domestic and foreign governments select 
emission taxes to maximize their respective net beneﬁts. Let the proﬁt of the downstream ﬁrm in 
country i from the contract subgame be denoted by 
d ip* iðt ; tf Þ ¼  max piðy ; Y ; $ i; FiÞ: 
yi ;$ i ;Fi 
The domestic welfare standard is the conventional one employed in the strategic environmental 
trade policy literature in which the output of downstream ﬁrm i is not consumed within country i 
and the environmental damage in country i depends only on the emissions in country i:9 The 
objective function of the domestic regulator is 
d d i i iWiðt ; tf Þ ¼ p* iðt ; tf Þ þ t e xi �Diðe xiÞ: ð11Þ 
Maximization of (11) supports the following result. 
Proposition 2. If ﬁrms in country i employ vertical contracts, the optimal non-cooperative 
environmental policy under quantity competition is the Pigouvian tax ðti ¼ Di Þ: x 
Proof. Consider the problem of the domestic regulator. Making use of Shepard’s lemma, eq. (1), 
and the downstream ﬁrm’s proﬁt-maximizing condition (2), the ﬁrst-order condition for the 
domestic regulator is 
d f d@y @y @yd d dPd d dð$d � w Þx þ y �Dd e x ¼ 0: ð12Þ0 y f x y@td @td @td 






and note that the linearity of td in (1) implies 
@yf ðtd; tf Þ=@td @yf ;cð$d; $ f Þ=@$d ¼ : 
@ydðtd; tf Þ=@td @yd;cð$d; $ f Þ=@$d
Substitution from (9) results in 
ðtd �DdÞe d x d ¼ 0: x y 
dNoting that ed40 and x 40 implies td ¼ Dd: By symmetry, tf ¼ Df : & y x x 
In [1,5], the optimal environmental policy under quantity competition imposes a weaker 
standard than the Pigouvian level. The reason for this is that under-internalizing marginal damage 
provides ﬁrms with the implicit export subsidy necessary to capture rent in the international 
market. That is, the optimal non-cooperative policy in these models represents a compromise 
between the opposing incentives of a government regulator to control pollution, on the one hand, 
and to provide competitive advantage for her ﬁrms on the other. When production is organized 
through vertical contracts, however, this outcome does not obtain. 
The proposition directs attention to an important feature that is implicit in the strategic trade 
literature. The presumption maintained in this literature is that the domestic regulator is capable 
of capturing international oligopoly rent that ﬁrms cannot themselves acquire through their 
activities in the private market. When vertical markets are introduced in the analysis, a 
downstream ﬁrm is able to commit to an input price that shifts international rent through 
decentralized contract design. Government export subsidization, as a consequence, becomes 
unnecessary. 
Models of strategic environmental policy with a private commitment stage have been 
considered previously by Ulph [18] for the case of emission-reducing R&D and by Ulph [17] and 
Simpson and Bradford [16] for the case of cost-reducing R&D. Apart from Ulph [18], who 
identiﬁes conditions in which a regulator would over-internalize marginal damage, the ﬁnding in 
9 Extension of the model in either direction would be relatively straightforward. 
this literature is the conventional one that policy under-internalizes the domestic externality. 
Unlike the case of vertical contracts, private commitment through R&D investment does not 
eliminate the role for strategic environmental trade policy. This is because R&D investment 
introduces an additional distortion in the model that prevents private and social incentives from 
aligning as they do here. For example, in [17] the strategic instrument of the regulator is an output 
tax, which substitutes imperfectly for private instruments levied at the R&D stage. 
It is important to note that vertically structured markets do not necessarily eliminate the role 
for strategic environmental trade policy. Our model implicitly assumes that vertical contracts are 
allowed under prevailing antitrust laws, and this produces a bargaining situation between 
upstream and downstream ﬁrms that fully capitalizes the strategic rents associated with input 
pricing. If vertical contracts are not allowed under prevailing antitrust laws, however, then the 
conventional strategic environmental trade policy result emerges once more. With vertical 
markets, a relevant focus for analysis is the relationship between domestic environmental policy 
and national (and international) antitrust laws. 
4. Price competition 
In this section we sketch the effects of vertical contracts under circumstances in which 
downstream ﬁrms compete in prices rather than in quantities. Let DiðPd; Pf Þ denote the demand 
function facing ﬁrm i in the international market, where Pd; Pf are the prices set by the domestic 
and foreign ﬁrm, respectively. We assume that the products are substitutes and satisfy the 
Di Di Di j � Di j i i d fdeﬁniteness property io0; j40; iDj jDi X0; and piio0; pij40; O ¼ pddpff � 
d f jpdf pfd4D
i
jpji : The latter conditions mirror those under quantity competition and ensure proﬁt 
maximization, upward-sloping reaction functions, and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in 
j jprices (see [7]). Finally, we assume Diip 4Dj
ipji ; which is a relatively mild condition satisﬁed jj 
iwhenever the own-price effects on Di and p are greater than the cross-price effects. Proceeding as i 
in the last section, we arrive at10 
Proposition 3. The equilibrium vertical contract for the downstream ﬁrm in country i involves an 
upstream price above the regulated price of the polluting input ð$ i4wiðtiÞÞ and a negative lump sum 
payment to the upstream ﬁrm ðFio0Þ: 
The optimal contract under price competition takes essentially the form of the contract 
considered by Bonanno and Vickers [2] and Shaffer [15]; the downstream ﬁrm contracts with the 
upstream ﬁrm to receive a lump-sum transfer in exchange for paying a higher unit price for the 
input.11 This is optimal because a contractual commitment to pay a higher input price by ﬁrm i 
10 Proofs of all propositions are available from the authors upon request. 
11 In contrast to the case of quantity competition, an upstream capacity constraint is not necessary here to protect the 
interest of upstream ﬁrms. However, downstream ﬁrms may have an incentive to buy silently from other upstream ﬁrms 
(at competitive prices) in this case. Hence, the contract under price competition may also involve an exclusive dealing 
provision. 
increases downstream production costs, which signals his rival that output will not be priced 
aggressively in the international market (i.e., a ‘‘puppy dog’’ ploy). The direct effect of the 
domestic price increase, of course, is exactly compensated by the ﬁxed payment; however, by 
committing to pay $d4wdðtdÞ for the input, the domestic downstream ﬁrm provides the foreign 
downstream ﬁrm with an incentive to raise his own price in response. The foreign price increase 
has a positive ﬁrst-order effect on domestic proﬁt. 
The objective function of the domestic regulator is, as before, 
d d i i iiðWiðt ; tf Þ ¼ p# t ; tf Þ þ t e xi �Diðe xiÞ; ð13Þ 
iðwhere p# td; tf Þ ¼ maxfPi ;$ i ;FigpiðPi; P; $ i; FiÞ denotes the proﬁt of the downstream ﬁrm in 
country i in the contract subgame. Maximization of (13) supports 
Proposition 4. If ﬁrms in country i employ vertical contracts, the optimal non-cooperative 
environmental policy under price competition is the Pigouvian tax ðti ¼ Di Þ: x 
To the extent that vertical contracts are allowed under prevailing antitrust laws, there is no 
strategic role for environmental policy. Under either price or quantity competition in the 
international oligopoly market, the optimal environmental policy is the Pigouvian tax. 
5. Concluding remarks 
This paper considered a noncooperative environmental policy game between governments 
under circumstances in which a domestic downstream exporter is able to form contractual 
arrangements with upstream input suppliers. Our results provide sharp contrast with the 
conventional strategic environmental trade policy result that the optimal tax is set below (above) 
the Pigouvian level under quantity (price) competition. To the extent that vertical contracts are 
feasible, we found a deviation from the Pigouvian tax in either case to be suboptimal. The reason 
for this is that, apart from the pollution externality, the incentive of the domestic regulator is 
aligned with her ﬁrms in the interest of shifting rent. Because the input pricing mechanism offered 
by a vertical contract is isomorphic to a pollution tax as a commitment instrument, government 
export promotion becomes unnecessary. 
A practical implication of this result is that the optimal non-cooperative environmental policy 
does not require the regulator to tax discriminate across domestic industries. This is a case of 
increasing policy relevance as governments continue to seek implementation of international 
environmental policy for multi-industry inputs such as NOx; SO2; and CO2: When a single 
polluting input is used to produce multiple export products, our policy recommendation is to 
allow for vertical contracts, to distress from export subsidization, and at the same time, to 
implement environmental regulation in the Pigouvian spirit. 
Our ﬁndings also emphasize an unrecognized and potentially important connection between 
environmental policy, international trade, and antitrust legislation. If vertical contracts are not 
allowed under prevailing national (and international) antitrust laws, then the familiar strategic 
environmental trade policy results emerge once more. Future research on strategic environmental 
trade policy should focus, not just on domestic pollution control policies, but on other 
institutional features of governance, such as the enactment, enforcement, and adjudication of 
national and international antitrust laws, that place these activities outside the scope of private 
contract design. 
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